



Istana Bogor



Village in Bantam, West Java, 1937
(Photo by Claire Holt)

GUIDED DEMOCRACY FOREIGN POLICY: 1960-1965
PRESIDENT SUKARNO MOVES FROM NON-
ALIGNMENT TO CONFRONTATION*

Frederick P. Bunnell

Well, frankly I tell you:
I belong to the group of people
who are bound in spiritual long-
ing by the Romanticism of Revolution. I am inspired by it, I am
fascinated by it, I am completely
absorbed by it, I am crazed, I am
obsessed by the Romanticism of
Revolution. And for this I utter
thanks to God Who Commands All
Nature!

Sukarno
August 17, 1960

The President's Foreign Policy

In the 1960's Indonesian foreign policy under Guided Democracy became an increasingly militant policy of struggle or confrontation against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism (or nekolim).⁽¹⁾ Although this policy had its roots in Indonesia's particularly traumatic emancipation from Dutch colonialism, its evolution under Guided Democracy depended primarily on President

* Editors' note: Originally prepared for the Asia Society Seminar on the Foreign Policies of Southeast Asian States held in New York on May 14 and 15, 1965, Mr. Bunnell's essay was presented in a somewhat altered and severely shortened form at the Society of Asian Studies Conference in New York on April 4, 1966. Apart from changing to the past tense in referring to Guided Democracy foreign policy, Mr. Bunnell has made no attempt to incorporate into his presentation the insights and data provided by events subsequent to the affair of October 1, 1965. He has also not attempted to consider the published views of other authors, such as Mr. Arnold Brackman and Dr. Bernard Gordon, whose recent books have treated the same subject from divergent perspectives.

(1) Nekolim is the acronym for neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism. Originated in early 1964 by Lieutenant General Yani, Commander of the Army, nekolim quickly became a fundamental part of Indonesian political language.

Sukarno. Despite the unquestioned power of the Indonesian army throughout this period and the prominence of the Communist Party (PKI) particularly in the latter years, the President maintained a personal dominance in foreign policy until the abortive coup of October 1, 1965 fostered the appearance of a new political system in Indonesia.(2)

Because of the President's determinant role in the emergence of Indonesia's confrontation policies, it is his motivations that provide the key to understanding Indonesian policy. Essentially these motivations consisted of the ideological-psychological impulses (and some such term is necessary) of a fervent nationalist. On the ideological level Sukarno embraced a neo-Marxist-Leninist view of contemporary history that pits the old capitalist nations of the West in a dialectic struggle with the emergent nations and the new socialist states. It was this idea that underlay Sukarno's confrontation policy. But the dynamic of the policy was the psychological need for self-respect felt by a political elite long-humiliated by colonialism. That need could best be filled by the quest for Indonesian prestige as a leader in the destruction of the perpetrators of Indonesia's humbling colonial experience -- the imperialist states of the West. These basic ideological-psychological impulses were, of course, not the exclusive elements in Sukarno's motivations, but in foreign policy they appear to have played the decisive role.

The evidence of the importance of these impulses in the President's policies is necessarily circumstantial, but nonetheless impressive. There is a basic consistency in both the nationalistic content and the emotional character of the Sukarno ideology as it has developed in his speeches and actions over a 40-year period. That record provides at least a clue to the consistent elements in the thinking and psychology of Sukarno. In addition, there is the testimony of the officials and the politically-conscious who have lived in Sukarno's political sphere for much of his long career. Both these sources point to the hypothesis of a basic consistency in Sukarno's ideologi-

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- (2) One major factor in Sukarno's dominance was his ability to balance the army and the Communist Party against each other. See Kahin, George McT., "Indonesia", in Kahin, George McT., ed., Major Governments of Asia, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 649-652. For a more detailed discussion of this relationship in the period from 1958-1962, see Feith, Herbert, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy", in McVey, Ruth, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1963), pp. 325-366. Also see a more recent revised statement of the balance relationship in Feith, Herbert, "President Sukarno, the Army, and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape", Asian Survey, Vol. 4, August 1964, pp. 969-980.

cal credo.⁽³⁾ What was new in recent years was the effort by Sukarno to project on the international stage the slogans of Indonesia's national revolution.⁽⁴⁾

Even if one can establish a basic ideological consistency in Sukarno's public career, the relative importance of his ideological credo in his policy decisions remains moot. Certainly the emotional character of the man and the militant tone of his speeches point to an important role for that credo. To be sure these vague ideological-psychological impulses did not prescribe specific courses of action, but they did set long-term goals, maintain fears, and establish priorities. Moreover, as Guided Democracy persisted in its efforts at indoctrination, it is likely that the state ideology tended to take a firmer hold on both the political-bureaucratic elite and the political public. An atmosphere and a momentum was generated that in turn reinforced the predilections of the original authors. Even the President could not be immune to this secondary effect of indoctrination programs.

Nationalist or Communist?

If one concludes that the role of ideological-psychological factors was crucial in the President's foreign policy, how does this affect other interpretations of Indonesian policy under Guided Democracy? The significance lies first of all in judging to what extent the President leaned toward communism internationally and nationally. The frequent Western charge often echoed by Indians and Yugoslavs -- that Sukarno was a spokesman for the Chinese Communist view must be qualified.

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- (3) A further indication of the compatibility of the content and tone of Sukarno's speeches during the colonial period with those of 1965 was the government regulation instituted in 1964 that all Indonesian newspapers print daily a selection from Sukarno's early speeches. Among the most famous of these and thus the ones now most frequently printed are the 1930 trial speech, "Indonesia Menggugat", and the 1933 "Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka".
 - (4) A rather recent instance of this conscious effort was the application of the domestic political slogan, nasakom, to the international sphere. Paralleling the Sukarno concept of the "new emerging forces", nasakom internationally meant the alliance of nationalist, religious, and communist nations and elements in a common front to defeat nekolim. As such it served as an especially useful device in Indonesia's effort to broaden the appeal of her ideology in Afro-Asian countries by offering a message somewhat distinctive from the Chinese People's Republic. For an example of nasakom applied internationally by Sukarno, see his speech at the celebration of the 45th anniversary of the PKI in The Indonesian Herald, May 24, 1965.

The similarity of the Sukarno credo with much in the Chinese line is undeniable. But many other nationalist leaders shared this affinity with the Chinese ideology. Moreover, the implication in the charge that Sukarno was speaking for someone else -- either in the sense that he had cynically become their spokesman for some price or in the sense that Sukarno's views were readily adaptable because of their lack of firm roots in his personal history -- must be denied. In short, the suggestion of either subservience or opportunism is questionable because of the historical depth and consistency in Sukarno's views.

At the same time, such an argument does not deny the fact that the Indonesians and the Chinese were engaged in political collaboration. But here the content of the consistent Sukarno credo is relevant. The central thread -- it appears -- was a vigorous nationalism that could never knowingly brook interference even from its most anti-imperialist friend. Moreover, even as she collaborated with China in the anti-imperialist struggle, it is plain that Indonesia retained not only her own ambitions for leadership, but a firm attachment to her own national ideology.⁽⁵⁾ Finally, it is noteworthy that the Chinese approach to Sukarno since 1960 had been based on a shrewd awareness of his personal and national pride.⁽⁶⁾

The nationalist content and the historical consistency of Sukarno's ideology also force questioning of speculation that the President may have been seeking to deliver power to the Communist Party.⁽⁷⁾ Predicated on the President's admitted attraction to the PKI's revolutionary ideology, this speculation underestimated the Sukarno devotion to Indonesian national unity. It has been his self-conscious lifetime task to forge a viable accommodation among the nationalist, religious, and communist groups. Without such an accommodation the President -- and most politically aware Indonesians -- foresaw a physical clash between these antagonistic groups. Such a clash would not only threaten Indonesia's internal unity, but it would impair her quest for leadership abroad.

(5) See, for example, the lead article in ibid., December 31, 1963.

(6) See Mozingo, David P., Sino-Indonesian Relations: An Overview, 1955-1965 (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, Memorandum RM-4641-PR, July 1965), pp. 1-5.

(7) Such speculation was rife in Djakarta diplomatic circles from at least 1963. For a careful statement of the issues see Feith, Herbert, "President Sukarno, the Army, and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape", pp. 977-980.

Because of this premium on national unity, Sukarno insisted that he favored no single party or ideological current. The visible increase in the PKI's political position under Guided Democracy -- particularly from the summer of 1962 -- tended to contradict this profession of impartiality.⁽⁸⁾ But two factors must be recalled. One was the political sophistication of the PKI in maximizing its power. The other was the President's acute awareness that the long-sought political accommodation had been delayed chiefly because of distrust of the communists in the other political circles. If then the President permitted a PKI expansion, it was in part because he felt that only as the communists were given positions of responsibility could they be assimilated into the Indonesian revolution, could they lose the threatened feeling of an outside group, could their rivals come to accept them as partners as well as rivals, and could it be assured that they would become nationalist communists.

Sukarno's increasing advocacy of the PKI must be understood also as a means of reducing the power of the strongest force -- apart from Sukarno himself -- in Indonesian politics. This was the army.⁽⁹⁾ Since its successful suppression of the 1958 PRRI-Permesta Rebellion, the army had vastly expanded its political position. Fully exploiting the special powers available to it under martial law, the army entrenched itself in the economic administration of the country while at the same time adding to its already overwhelming superiority in arms. More importantly from the standpoint of Sukarno's personal position and the prospects for his nasakom accommodation, the army showed its hostility to the PKI by harassing it whenever the opportunity arose. Although Sukarno's political maneuvers within the army gradually weakened the collective resolve of the officer corps to crush the PKI, at the end of the Guided Democracy period the Army General Staff still opposed nasakom. As the most upwardly mobile social group within the Djakarta political elite, the army leadership had come to oppose the PKI not merely on grounds of its alleged international connections -- the reality of which had been proved to many of the older officers by the 1948 Madiun Affair -- but also because of the army's own vested interests in the spoils of Guided Democracy. In short, the army constituted the primary obstacle to the realization of Sukarno's goal of a nationalist, but radical left, nasakom Indonesia.

(8) Ibid, pp. 969-977. Also see Pauker, Guy, "Indonesia in 1964: Toward a 'People's Democracy?'" in Asian Survey, Vol. 5, February 1965, pp. 88-97.

(9) See Lev, Daniel S., "Political Role of Army in Indonesia", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, Winter 1963-1964, pp. 349-364.

Understandably Western diplomats dismissed nasakom as simply a PKI trojan horse ridden by a communist-leaning and romantically naive Sukarno. If nasakom required Sukarno's sponsorship of the PKI coupled with maneuvering to weaken the army, clearly the West would be the loser. In any coalition of Indonesian political forces, surely the organized, dedicated, and tactically adept PKI would eventually prevail. In reply to this standard Western view of mid-summer 1965, Sukarno would undoubtedly have said that, without a nasakom reconciliation, both the nation and the society would be ripped asunder.(10)

Prestige, Distraction, Balance, and Expansionism

Another area where the ideological-psychological factors clearly play an important part in presidential foreign policy is the series of international conferences with which Indonesia has been identified. As the host of the Bandung Conference of 1955, she made persistent efforts to establish a second Asian-African (AA) Conference. Dating back to 1956, these initiatives had some connection with her desire to rally organized support for her claims to West Irian, but the pursuit of status constituted an important quest in itself for the proud Sukarno. And beyond this was the belief that since Indonesia won her independence through physical struggle and not as a gift from the colonial power, she must pioneer in revolutionizing Malaya, the Philippines, and other recipients of counterfeit independence.(11)

The presence of ideological-psychological factors in Sukarno's motivation would force qualification of popular

(10) For representative discussions of this problem of accommodation by Sukarno himself, see his recent Independence Day speeches. In particular, see the one on August 17, 1960, in Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man (Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1961), pp. 79-118. Also see address of August 17, 1964, Departmen Penerangan, Tahun "Vivere Pericoloso" (A Year of Dangerous Living), pp. 27-28, 45-46. The author has also relied here in large degree on arguments presented by the world's two leading scholars on the role of the PKI under Guided Democracy. See McVey, Ruth T., "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy", in Barnett, A. Doak, ed., Communist Strategies in Asia (New York: Praeger University Series, 1963), pp. 148-190, and Hindley, Donald, The Communist Party of Indonesia: 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 275-304.

(11) Kahin, George McT., "Malaysia and Indonesia", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 37, Fall 1964, pp. 253-270. Also see, for example, Sukarno's ridicule of Malaysia's subservience to the British in his address of August 17, 1964, op. cit., pp. 35-37.

interpretations about distraction, balance, and expansionism in Indonesian foreign policy. Distraction had great currency during the West Irian campaign; it became even more common during the "Crush Malaysia" struggle. This is the notion that the President felt compelled to generate conferences and crises in order to distract a population beset by economic neglect. As a conscious motive on the part of the President such a calculation may have operated. But far more significant was his impulsive assertion of personal-national importance. Moreover, there is the question of how Sukarno evaluated Indonesia's economic ills. He was by his own admission uninterested in economic problems. Perhaps as a result of failure in this sphere he publicly denied the urgency of economic development in the initial phases of nation-building. Consistently, he insisted that the elimination of all foreign influences -- political, economic, cultural -- must precede full attention to domestic economic growth. Finally, whatever the President's assessment of Indonesia's economic problems, it clearly deviated from that of most Western observers who were inclined to see more hardship than was actually felt by Indonesians who had endured far worse conditions during the Japanese occupation.(12)

Another popular interpretation of the President's foreign policy derived from domestic politics. This may be called the "balance theory." It pictured Sukarno as determining his domestic and foreign moves in such a way as to keep the army and the Communist Party effectively checkmated in their respective efforts to augment their power vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis the President. Being a shrewd politician, Sukarno must have often calculated in this way, but it should not be thought of in terms of a rigorous formula. Many moves were apparently of a quite different order -- i.e., impulsive, instinctive responses to particular problems as they arose. The "balance theory" also implied a deference on the President's part to other political forces that usually did not operate.

The confrontation with Malaysia provoked charges that territorial expansion had also become a major aim of presidential policy. One is skeptical of this view, again because of the prominence of the ideological-psychological factors evident in much of the government propaganda on Malaysia. The case for territorial expansion would have been more convincing if there had been contemporary evidence of Indonesian leaders laying claim to the Borneo territories of Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. There was, in any case, no preparation in the government

(12) For Sukarno's view on the role of economic development in nation-building, see his speech before the October 1964 Cairo Conference, Department of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, 1964, "The Era of Confrontation," p. 20.

propaganda for the eventuality of Indonesian seizure and occupation of those areas. This, of course, does not deny the possibility that this was Sukarno's aim. What was more likely, however, was Indonesian "expansionism" in the sense of creating a sphere of influence. Djakarta was determined to expel all imperialist influence from Southeast Asia -- asserting its own influence there, especially in insular Southeast Asia and Malaya -- and if necessary eventually to contest with China for paramountcy of influence.

From Non-Alignment to Confrontation: 1960-1965

As already stressed, President Sukarno was the prime factor in determining the emergence of an Indonesian confrontation foreign policy in the 1960's. His ascendancy in foreign affairs arose, however, only after the advent of Guided Democracy. Formally decreed on July 5, 1959, this authoritarian political system had actually been in genesis since the collapse of parliamentary democracy in early 1957. In the subsequent transition period the President's political energies were absorbed in displacing the relatively moderate, Western-leaning leadership of the liberal period.⁽¹³⁾

During the central government's suppression of the regional rebellions from 1958 to 1961 a new distribution of power took shape. Dominant was a coalition of mutually dependent but antagonistic partners. The senior partner was the master politician, the imaginative agitator, the romantic nationalist, Sukarno. The junior partner was the status-hungry army, untutored in political ideology and tactics, but loyal to Sukarno even as it differed with him on the amount of freedom to be allowed the Communist Party. As for the political parties which survived under the martial law of the army and the authoritarian power of the President, it was the Communist Party that weighed most significantly in the political balance. Having proven its capacity to mobilize an expanding mass base in the 1957 provincial elections, the PKI continued its national front strategy. By providing the President with the organized mass support that he both needed and admired, the PKI hoped to win presidential protection from army harassment. In addition, the PKI sought the time to discipline its still largely unpoliticized following in the villages. At the same time identification with Sukarno could in time assist the PKI in winning the legitimacy

(13) In addition to the works cited in footnote 2, a detailed discussion of the liberal period can be found in Feith, Herbert, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

which it lost in the 1948 Madiun Rebellion.(14)

Preoccupied with consolidating his own political power and erecting the institutions of Guided Democracy, President Sukarno had little opportunity to follow his predilections for a vigorous confrontation foreign policy until the late summer of 1960. At that juncture Sukarno simultaneously intensified pressure for the recovery of West Irian and moved to establish Indonesia as an Asian-African leader. This initial phase of confrontation ended with the settlement of the Irian issue in August 1962. There followed a year of hesitation that nearly saw Indonesia restrain her budding confrontation policy for internal economic development. But with the collapse in September 1963 of the Manila Agreements which Sukarno had signed with Malaya and the Philippines in August, Indonesia adopted a policy of all-out confrontation not only toward Malaysia but toward the International Olympic Committee, the United Nations, and other manifestations of what Sukarno viewed as Western domination of the new nations. Congruent with this policy, the concept of the new emerging forces became the hallmark of Indonesia's confrontation policy.

Policy of Confrontation Phase One:
August 1960 - August 1962

By the late summer of 1960, it has been noted, President Sukarno had sufficiently consolidated his political power to permit increased attention to the external aspects of his nation-building endeavors. Failing to win army backing, the last organized political opposition to Guided Democracy had ended with the banning of its leading sponsors -- the large, modernist Islamic Masjumi Party and the small, intellectual Socialist Party. Then early in September the President successfully withstood a threatened challenge to his encouragement of the PKI from a number of regional military commanders. Meanwhile, the army had further reduced the numbers of remaining rebels to the point where a year later their leaders would surrender themselves. While intense political maneuvering continued among the three principal political forces -- the President, the army, and the rising PKI -- Indonesia had achieved a greater measure of political stability than at any time since the early 1950's.(15)

It was in this context of growing political stability at home that President Sukarno made the first serious attempts to launch what would by 1965 become a policy of full "confrontation"

(14) See Feith in "Dynamics of Guided Democracy."

(15) For the fullest discussion of domestic political development at this stage, consult ibid.

against imperialism and colonialism. And consistent with that later, more ambitious policy President Sukarno concentrated his efforts simultaneously on two tasks. One was regional, the other virtually world-wide. Priority went at this juncture to the regional task -- the recovery of West Irian from the Dutch. Although a special issue because of the irredentist nature of the Indonesian claim, Sukarno repeatedly placed it in the broader context of thwarting an imperialist scheme against the Indonesian revolution. It is this aspect together with the implicit nationalist assertion involved that provides a link between the West Irian issue and the Malaysian question. Meanwhile, simultaneous with the prosecution of this regional claim, Sukarno initiated efforts to establish Indonesia as a leader of the emerging nations. Consistent with the drift toward a policy of militant confrontation against nekolim, that quest for leadership steadily shifted its ideological banner from non-alignment to an increasingly exclusive emphasis on Asian-African solidarity. It is these developments together with the West Irian campaign that characterize the course of Indonesian foreign affairs from August 1960 to August 1962. But there was a prior condition that had to be satisfied before Indonesia could seriously hope to give credibility to her claims to both West Irian and Afro-Asian leadership. This was a modern military capability.

The Acquisition of a Modern Military Capability: Implications for Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations

Since the final frustration in 1957 of Indonesia's attempt to seek the U.N. General Assembly's support on the West Irian issue, Sukarno had understood that he could not recover West Irian until he acquired sufficient heavy military equipment to back up his demands.⁽¹⁶⁾ Moreover, in the quest for influence

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- (16) In his Independence Day address on August 17, 1960, Sukarno described the evolution of Indonesia's policy on the question of West Irian in these terms: ". . . finally, finally, a few years ago dawn broke through on our West Irian policy. Finally, a couple of years ago, we changed the nature of our struggle from 'friendly persuasion of the Dutch' to return West Irian to us, it became a policy of confrontation of all our national forces with those of the Dutch in the question of West Irian. From that moment on, we re-discovered the fact that national struggle is a matter of strength, a matter of 'formation and utilization of power', a matter of struggle, and not at all a matter of 'begging'. That moment was the moment of 're-discovery of our Revolution'! Indeed! we are no longer begging for talks with the Dutch on the question of West Irian: we will continue to carry out the policy of 'other methods' until West Irian is returned to the sovereignty of the Republic." Sukarno went on to break diplomatic

in Southeast Asia and the broader world of Afro-Asian affairs, Sukarno felt strongly that Indonesia should have a military establishment commensurate with her size and population. Not only would this reduce the likelihood of Western intervention, but it would make Indonesia more powerful than any of her immediate neighbors -- the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, and Australia. Finally, Sukarno craved modern military power as a status symbol to impress both his own people and the leaders of Afro-Asia.

Although the army leaders shared Sukarno's perception of the importance of modern arms to Indonesia's security and prestige, it appears that they differed with him over whether the United States or the Soviet Union should supply the arms.(17) While the facts are still not clear on the relations between the army and Sukarno on this question, it is certain that the army made one final plea to Washington for heavy arms in early October 1960. Presented by General Abdul Haris Nasution himself, this plea was rejected by the Eisenhower Administration. And thus it was that a somewhat reluctant General Nasution journeyed to Moscow in January 1961 to sign an arms purchase agreement totaling 450 million dollars.

Sukarno's satisfaction with this agreement clearly went beyond the realization of his immediate objective -- to acquire a modern military capability sufficient to give support to both his claim to West Irian and his quest for Afro-Asian leadership. A subsidiary cause for Sukarno's satisfaction lay in the leftward thrust the agreement gave both Indonesian politics and foreign relations.

Domestically it seemed likely that the Soviets would employ their new leverage to assist Sukarno in curbing the army's harassment of the PKI -- harassment that had culminated in

relations with the Netherlands and announced a "policy for the liberation of West Irian in a revolutionary manner." See the English translation of this speech entitled "Like an Angel that Strikes from the Skies", in Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man, pp. 108-109.

- (17) The army's stance on this question is based primarily on remarks made to the author by diplomats on the American side.

For a press account of General Nasution's October 1960 mission to Washington corroborated by diplomatic sources on both sides, see The New York Times, October 6 and 7, 1960. For discussion of the Nasution mission to Moscow and its implications, see Feith, Herbert, "Indonesia", in Kahin, George McT., ed., Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 265-270.

August 1960 with the temporary banning of PKI activities by local military commanders in three provinces.(18) Surely the diplomatic necessity of not offending the major supplier of Indonesian arms would tend to deter the army somewhat -- particularly when additional arms agreements were regarded as essential to West Irian strategy.

Furthermore, although the army would gain in power and prestige from the agreement, it was in fact the navy and the air force that would receive the warships and jet planes.(19) More tractable to Sukarno and Soviet influence than the army, these strengthened services could perhaps be used to restrict the army's domination of the armed forces. Finally, the reduction in the relative importance of the United States' influence in the Indonesian armed forces was coupled with understandable pique among army leaders at the repeated refusal of the United States to grant their requests for heavy arms.

It was, however, the context in which the agreement was made which gave the greatest boost to Sukarno's leftward orientation at home and abroad. The issue at hand was the highly emotional, nationalist claim to West Irian. The public reluc-

(18) See Pauker, Guy, "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40, July 1962, pp. 612-626, for an exaggerated estimate of the potential Soviet influence in the Indonesian army. Moreover, he overlooks the possibility that the Soviets may have already decided not to press in this direction at all. In short, the brewing Sino-Soviet dispute may have caused them to bank on the Indonesian army rather than the PKI to counter Chinese influence in Indonesia. For an account of army harassment of the PKI in the summer of 1960, see Feith, Herbert, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy", pp. 337-339.

(19) Soviet military aid during the West Irian campaign eventually totalled nearly 1 billion dollars. It included, among other items, a 19,000-ton cruiser (later named the West Irian), TU-16 long-range bombers, and MIG-19 supersonic fighters. See Pauker, "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia", p. 615. Compare with Nation (Sydney, Australia), November 3, 1962. Because of the highly sophisticated character of the arms received, the navy and air force became heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for initial training of men to operate and maintain the equipment. Subsequently, the need for highly specialized repairs served to maintain Soviet influence in these two forces. In contrast, the army received much less sophisticated equipment from the Soviets. Moreover, the United States continued to deliver small arms to the army and train many of its officers. For estimates of Indonesian naval and air strength in 1962, see The New York Times, November 11, 1962.

tance of the United States to assist Indonesia either diplomatically or by selling her heavy arms became dramatically juxtaposed with the Soviet Union's vociferous diplomatic support and her generous military aid. As it came in the wake of the Khrushchev visit of a year before with its 250 million dollars in economic aid, the image of both the Soviet Union and communism generally had never appeared more attractive to the Indonesian political public.⁽²⁰⁾

Ironically from the Soviet standpoint, the enhanced stature of communism arising from Russian arms aid may well have facilitated Sukarno's effort to restore close relations with China.⁽²¹⁾ From early 1959 into the summer of 1960 Sino-Indonesian relations had deteriorated under the impact of the army-backed persecution of Chinese in West Java. Then in the fall of 1960 the way opened to a rapprochement. This was due in part to Chinese recognition of Sukarno's efforts to stop the persecutions. The primary factor, however, was the decision by Peking to sacrifice its standing with overseas Chinese for the higher priority of cultivating Sukarno as an ally. Both Sukarno and Peking by early 1961 had apparently recognized their respective interests in collaborating to propagate a militant anti-imperialism among Afro-Asian nations. Symbolized by the visits of Chen Yi to Djakarta in April 1961 and of Sukarno to Peking in June, this budding collaboration immediately gave pause to the already concerned Soviets and Americans.

(20) As Feith and others have properly cautioned, the shift to the left is easy to exaggerate. In addition to the role the United States was to play in the West Irian dispute, she still retained far more leverage on Indonesia than the Soviets and the Chinese combined. Apart from the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the nearby South China Sea, the U.S. military and economic aid (including badly needed rice shipments under the PL480 program) continued at a rate of approximately 50 million dollars for fiscal year 1961. Indonesia's trade remained centered on the West and Japan, while anti-communist sentiment was still dominant among the government elite with its heavy military component. Finally, Sukarno's own ideological hostility to America seemed susceptible to softening in 1961 with the coming to power of the highly popular President Kennedy, and the continuing exertions of American Ambassador Howard P. Jones, for whom Sukarno has often shown high personal regard. Compare Brackman, Arnold, Indonesian Communism (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 264-306.

(21) The irony arises from the likelihood that Soviet economic and military aid was at least in part directed at countering China's expansion of influence in Indonesia. For this point and other matters related to Sino-Indonesian relations in the 1959-1961 period as well as subsequently, see Mazingo, op. cit.

In the spring of 1961, however, the chief item on Sukarno's agenda was not the promising new relationship with China. It was the recovery of West Irian, and for this task the combination of Soviet arms and American diplomatic support were the most important instruments. Not until 1963 with the opening of a new phase of Indonesia's confrontation foreign policy would Peking and Djakarta develop the intimacy that would lead to what by the summer of 1965 Sukarno would term an axis relationship.(22)

The Recovery of West Irian(23)

The final stage in Indonesia's multifaceted campaign to recover West Irian commenced on December 19, 1961, when President Sukarno delivered his widely heralded "Trihora" command to the nation to prepare for mobilization. Shortly thereafter he promised that Irian would return to Indonesia before the end of 1962. These dramatic announcements served to generate the emotions of his people to a new intensity. But in addition, Sukarno clearly sought to demonstrate to the outside world his determination to use the arms just received from the Russians -- if necessary. This implicit warning was greeted with some initial scoffing abroad, but it proved to be a well-timed maneuver for reaching his chief targets -- the Dutch and the Americans.

As the stubborn opponents of the Indonesians during the 12 years of the dispute over West Irian, the Dutch would not be budged easily from their refusal to transfer the area to Djakarta. For 11 years they had successfully resisted all efforts -- bilateral and multilateral via the United Nations -- even to negotiate. Now in the fall of 1961 they were, however, in a desperate position. Ironically, they had come to this point in the wake of their most imaginative and attractive stratagem of the entire decade of the dispute.(24) This was the Luns Plan

(22) See subsequent discussion.

(23) A review of the history of the West Irian dispute up to 1958 can be found in Bone, Robert, The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1958) and Van der Kroef, J. M., The West New Guinea Dispute (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958). For the subsequent period, see Brackman, op. cit., pp. 264-306.

(24) For the official Indonesian reaction to the Luns Plan, see the speech of Foreign Minister Subandrio in the General Debate of the General Assembly on October 9, 1961. Department of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, 1961, Statement on West Irian, pp. 13-23.

which called for the transfer of West Irian to U.N. trusteeship with the eventual goal of granting independence to the Papuans who had just started on the path of self-government with Dutch coaching. But this plan met defeat in the U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 1961. Accordingly, in the wake of Trikora the Dutch faced the equally unpalatable alternatives of risking war with Sukarno or negotiating with him. Negotiations would inevitably involve not only their exit from West Irian -- which they were prepared to accept -- but the discussion of the Indonesian demand for transfer of the area to Indonesia. Indeed, Sukarno insisted that the Dutch must agree to the principle of transfer as a precondition for holding talks.

Recalling the diplomacy of the Indonesian revolution which invoked the assistance of the United Nations and the United States, Sukarno recognized that the Dutch could not be moved into negotiations without pressure from friends -- pressure to soften the humiliation of succumbing to a man detested by the Dutch and backed by international communist arms and propaganda. The Trikora speech -- though certainly not the sole factor -- produced a predictable response from both the United Nations and the United States. In fact, U Thant and President Kennedy issued virtually identical appeals to the Dutch and the Indonesians to forego force and seek a negotiated solution in the interests of world peace.

What Indonesia had failed to achieve in years of diplomatic effort in the United Nations and in Washington suddenly came to be. The moral authority of the United Nations was at last publicly behind a negotiated solution that the General Assembly had refused to endorse on several occasions. More important, the powerful United States had at last begun to move from passive neutrality toward active mediation. To both the Indonesians and the Dutch this shift of attitude was tantamount to a shift from the Dutch to the Indonesian side. Just as passive neutrality meant tacit support for the status quo, so active mediation was tacit support for a change -- a change that could only benefit the Indonesian position. In short, in the wake of Trikora -- not solely because of it, however -- the Indonesians had successfully restructured the international context of the dispute to their distinct advantage.

The shift in the American position testifies further to the shrewdness and the boldness of Indonesia's diplomatic strategy. From the perspective of their revolution, the Indonesians had come to realize that America's professed support for the aspirations of newly emerging nations would not in itself cause her to oppose a close NATO ally, such as the Netherlands. Moreover, the American intervention in the rebellion of 1958 had reinforced substantially suspicion of the U.S. attitude towards Sukarno's Guided Democracy. While there had been something of a rapprochement since that low point in relations, suspicion lingered.

Washington's refusal to sell Indonesia the arms she needed to apply pressure on the Dutch underscored the conviction that America herself must be pressured before she would assist Indonesia on the Irian issue. Just as cold war considerations influenced the United States to intervene in the years 1949 and 1958, so this would be the lever in 1961-1962. Certainly one major intended effect of the purchase of arms from the Soviets was to awaken American fears of expanded communist influence. The Trikora speech presented the further disturbing possibility of a war between Indonesia and the Netherlands. As President Kennedy made clear, the American interest lay in preventing such a conflict.⁽²⁵⁾ Not only could it involve the cold war antagonists in a dangerous confrontation, but it would at the very least greatly enhance the influence of communism in Indonesian domestic and foreign affairs. Such were the fears that Indonesia calculated -- apparently correctly -- would be decisive in enlisting American intervention in the Irian dispute.

Another factor that contributed to the Indonesian pressures on Washington was the Kennedy Administration's ardent attempt to develop a relationship of mutual trust with President Sukarno. This attempt seemed to progress in the meeting between Sukarno and Kennedy in April 1961. More important, Washington demonstrated its good will by promising to send an economic survey mission to Indonesia. Both sides apparently interpreted this as a tacit promise that America would expand her aid program -- provided the West Irian dispute was settled peacefully. In retrospect, this tacit promise may have acted more as a lever on the American position than on the Indonesian position. The deepening American resolve to encourage Indonesia on the path of political stability and economic development appears to have led to some wishful thinking in Washington.⁽²⁶⁾

In any case, the expectation arose in the United States -- and among many Indonesian diplomats and politicians as well -- that President Sukarno would settle down to economic problems once Irian was recovered. To what extent the fostering of that expectation was a conscious part of the Indonesian approach to Washington is unclear. What is clear is that such an expectation contributed to the shift in the American stance on West Irian. It is evident, however, that it did not weigh as heavily as the cold war fears engendered by the Indonesian strategy.

(25) See description of U.S. position in The New York Times, December 20 and 27, 1961.

(26) This is, of course, a matter of interpretation. But with the benefit of hindsight, a number of American officials are willing to concede that there was, indeed, some wishful thinking in the U.S. expectation that Sukarno would concentrate on domestic affairs after the Irian settlement.

The achieving of a realignment of the diplomatic position of the Americans -- not to mention the Dutch and the United Nations -- did not, however, make the realization of Sukarno's demands inevitable. But the basic pattern of pressures -- direct and indirect -- military and diplomatic -- that had effected the breakthrough were intensified in succeeding months to finally win the virtually complete capitulation of the Dutch. Following Trikora, military pressure mounted with the stepping up of Indonesian infiltration into Irian. Significantly, as distasteful as such tactics were to both U Thant and the State Department, neither backed Dutch demands that attacks cease during negotiations. Rather they intensified exertions to arrange and expedite negotiations. U Thant's personal pleas, the Robert Kennedy mission, and then the skilled mediation of the State Department's Ellsworth Bunker all contributed to the final settlement. Concurrently, however, Sukarno maintained his pressures. Risking provocation of the Dutch and disillusionment of the Americans, he permitted parachute landings in Irian in April 1962. Whatever the risks in such measures, they served to sustain the credibility of Indonesia's readiness to liberate Irian by force -- if the negotiations collapsed.⁽²⁷⁾ Finally, during the concluding stage of the negotiations at the end of July, Indonesia actually moved her forces into position for invasion. At this point the President faced the ultimate decision of war or peace. While the military leaders did not advocate the war alternative, they were prepared to risk costly losses.⁽²⁸⁾ Moreover, a tremendous psychological momentum had been generated by the long mobilization process. Many of the field commanders were more than ready, they were itchy for the chance to pounce. Meanwhile, Washington strongly urged restraint, while Moscow

(27) One high ranking Dutch diplomat who was deeply involved in the West Irian question in 1962 has assured the author that the Dutch believed that Sukarno was not bluffing - i.e., that he would use force if negotiations did not bear fruit. The same source asserted that high American officials -- including Robert Kennedy -- were similarly convinced of Sukarno's determination to use force if necessary. This is consistent with the author's own impression of the American estimate of Sukarno's intentions.

(28) The attitude of the military leadership at this juncture is still a matter of controversy. Moreover, it seems likely that the leadership was not entirely united on which was the preferred solution from the standpoint of the army's political position. Whatever these differences there is no question that the army would have responded energetically to a presidential order to attack. For one view of the evolution of the army views on West Irian, see Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy", pp. 353-354.

reportedly pressed for an invasion.⁽²⁹⁾ Ultimately Sukarno accepted the highly favorable terms negotiated by Malik and Subandrio in Washington.⁽³⁰⁾ In doing so he demonstrated his craft in "confrontation" diplomacy -- a mix of bold, cunning, and sometimes unpredictable maneuvers -- and achieved for himself and the diplomats the glory that might have been reserved to the military if war had occurred.

First Departures from Non-Alignment

Simultaneous with his bold prosecution of the West Irian campaign, President Sukarno opened his related effort to establish Indonesia as a leader of the emergent nations. Choosing the dramatic occasion of the gathering of chiefs of state at the United Nations in September 1960, Sukarno appealed to the new nations to join in a crusade "to build the world anew" -- a world in which the emerging countries would attain the self-respect of an equal share in both the councils and the riches of the world. Such a utopia could, however, be attained only by a relentless struggle -- a confrontation -- against all the bulwarks of power controlled by the capitalist nations of the West. The dialectic process of history demanded that this contest be arduous, but it also guaranteed ultimate victory to the new nations. Here, then, was the core of the "confrontation"

(29) President Kennedy is said to have issued a very firm warning to Subandrio at their meeting on July 26 not to resort to force but to settle for the considerable concessions the Dutch had already made. In that this report has been corroborated by a reliable Dutch source, the author is inclined to accept it. Generally, of course, the Dutch were very irritated by the manner in which the United States had allegedly "sprung" the Bunker Plan on them. For the Russians' reported pressure on the Indonesians, see the account of Anastas Mikoyan's visit to Djakarta in late July in Brackman, *op. cit.*, p. 298. For reference to earlier Russian displeasure with the American-sponsored path of negotiation, see Pauker, "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia", p. 613.

(30) Both American and Indonesian officials have emphasized to the author how close Indonesia came to launching an invasion of Irian on the very eve of the August 15th settlement. This final crisis point in the long negotiations centered on the "flag issue" -- i.e., at what point the Dutch flag should be lowered and the Indonesian raised. The American mediator, Bunker, is credited with the ingenious formula that settled this issue. See The New York Times, August 10-17, 1962. An earlier critical period in the negotiations arose over Dutch resistance to Indonesia's escalation of her demands in the last week of July. See ibid., July 27 and August 1, 1962.

policy that had always been central in Sukarno's thinking and emotions. (31)

Inseparable from this militant anti-imperialist crusade was another facet of Sukarno's nationalism -- the personal cum national quest for the prestige and status of leadership of the new nations. Manifest in Sukarno's claim that Indonesia's experience in nation-building was worthy of study by other nations, this ambition was even more strikingly revealed in Sukarno's proposal that the Indonesian national credo (the Pantjasila) be incorporated into the U.N. Charter.

As prominent as were the anti-imperialist and national ambitions themes in Sukarno's U.N. address, the speech is also notable for its attention to the typical concerns of non-alignment which by the fall of 1964 Sukarno had largely repudiated. In September 1960, however, when he spoke to the General Assembly, the recent collapse of the Paris meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev had made the cold war a pressing matter even for a leader preoccupied with the threat of imperialism. Arguing the "vital importance" of disarmament, Sukarno vigorously condemned nuclear testing. Moreover, he personally joined four other non-aligned leaders in formally proposing that Khrushchev and Eisenhower resume their talks. Even more notable given his forceful appeal for an anti-imperialist crusade, Sukarno described the contemporary world as divided into three camps -- the two cold war blocs and the non-aligned, the nations of Asia and Africa. A year later, it should be observed, Sukarno had already amended this view so heavily influenced by the cold war situation.

During 1961 the President's preoccupation with advancing his anti-imperialist campaign took increasing precedence over his role as non-aligned mediator of the cold war. This was most evident in his promotion of a second AA Conference. Too often

(31) For Sukarno's speech to the United Nations, see "To Build the World Anew" in Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man, pp. 119-149. For comparison with Sukarno's earlier speeches see his June 1, 1945, "The Birth of Pantja Sila", his May 17, 1956, speech to the U.S. Congress, and his August 17, 1959, "Political Manifesto" in ibid. For his pre-revolution speeches, see particularly Departmen Penerangan, Penerbitan Khusus No. 168, "Indonesia Menggugat" (Indonesia Accuses). This was Sukarno's speech in December 1930 before the Dutch court trying him for political subversion. For commentary on and selections from Sukarno's foreign policy ideology during the Guided Democracy period, see Modelski, George, ed., The New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy (Canberra: Australian National University, 1963).

seen as only another diplomatic means of strengthening his propaganda position on West Irian, this effort basically derived from a much broader and highly personal concern to advance both the anti-imperialist crusade and the role of Indonesia in the AA world.

In a pattern of response that would repeat itself three years later, only the People's Republic of China evinced enthusiasm for Indonesia's proposal. The dominant Asian-African feeling was expressed by the still highly respected Jawaharlal Nehru and the influential Gamal Abdel Nasser. They not only questioned the urgency of Sukarno's anti-imperialism, but they warned that conflicts among Asian-African nations might disrupt a regional conference. To Sukarno's personal disappointment his proposal not only failed to win support, but his two potential rivals for AA leadership joined with Yugoslavia to launch a Conference of Non-Aligned Nations.⁽³²⁾ Although partly appeased by the vague promise of a second AA Conference later and the prestige of co-sponsoring the non-aligned conference, Sukarno persisted in his ideological dissent from the Nehru-Tito-Nasser stress on the urgency of the non-aligned nations mediating the cold war. What was still only implicit in his "To Build the World Anew" address a year earlier now became plain in his address to the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in September 1961.

Speaking on the day after the announcement by Moscow of its unilateral resumption of nuclear testing, Sukarno demonstrated his waning sense of concern about the role of non-aligned nations in mediating between the cold war antagonists.⁽³³⁾ Consistent with the definition of non-alignment that Indonesia had successfully pressed for at the preparatory meeting for the Belgrade Conference, Sukarno's stress was on the necessity of combatting imperialism, colonialism, and their more subtle manifestations in post-independence societies, neo-colonialism. That combat

(32) The apparent failure of Sukarno's efforts to rally support for a second Bandung Conference in the spring of 1961 emerges from a study of Indonesian press reports on the mission of Deputy Foreign Minister Supeni to six Asian-African countries. See particularly dispatches in Indonesian News Agency PIA for February 10, March 21, April 1, and May 8. For comparison see the official Indonesian version of the genesis of the Belgrade Conference, Department of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, 1961, "Indonesia and the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries", p. 5.

(33) For Sukarno's speech before the Belgrade Conference, see Department of Information, Special Issue 1961, No. 80, "From Non-Alignment to Coordinated Accumulation of Moral Force Toward Friendship, Peace and Social Justice Among Nations."

deserved priority, for it was these evil forces, not the cold war, that constituted the most urgent threat to world peace.

Such a position did not as yet involve a complete repudiation of the non-aligned powers' customary preoccupation with active mediation of cold war disputes. Indeed, Sukarno himself served as one of the conference's emissaries to Washington to present a plea for peace. But the emphasis in Sukarno's speech became the guideline for Indonesia's adamant fight with India in the conference drafting committee over whether the priority should be given to Nehru's call for mediation in the cause of world peace or Sukarno's call for an intensification of the crusade against imperialism in the interests of a new world. As had already become clear from the differing positions of Indonesia and India on the Congo issue, Indonesia was moving toward a position of militant confrontation.⁽³⁴⁾

In retrospect, Djakarta's political leaders and diplomats invariably point to this Belgrade Conference as a milestone in the development of Indonesia's foreign policy under Guided Democracy. This is in part because it was in his airport speech on returning home from Belgrade that the President first coined his now familiar expression, "the new emerging forces," to describe the "emerging forces" discussed in his Belgrade speech, i.e., the developing nations, the socialist nations, and the progressive elements in the established nations. In a dialectical struggle predetermined by history it was the task of these new emerging forces to destroy the "old established forces" of imperialism and colonialism in a crusade to build the world anew.⁽³⁵⁾ The world was now -- as in fact it had always been in Sukarno's emotions -- a world divided into these two hostile camps. The resulting impact on Indonesia's foreign relations would be enormous.

Policy of Confrontation Phase Two: Fall 1962 - Summer 1965

The Watershed: August 1962 - September 1963

From the vantage point of mid-1965, the year August 1962 through September 1963 marks a watershed in Indonesian foreign

(34) For a penetrating discussion of the divergent approaches of non-aligned countries to the Congo issue in 1961, see Good, Robert, "The Congo Crisis: A Study of Post-Colonial Politics" in Martin, Lawrence, ed., Neutralism and Non-Alignment (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 34-63.

(35) See Sukarno speech to the Belgrade Conference, op. cit. For the fullest elaboration of the concept of the new emerging forces, see Department of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, 1965, "New Forces Build A New World."

policy.⁽³⁶⁾ This is so because after the settlement of the Irian issue in mid-August 1962 Indonesia was freer than at any point in her short history to choose between domestic economic development and a bold foreign policy. In practice President Sukarno seems to have rather vacillated between the mutually exclusive alternatives before making his choice for the latter in September 1963.

The reasons behind this crucial decision reveal the dynamics of Indonesia's policy. Central was Sukarno's frank disinterest in the undramatic problems of economics. Even as he gave his blessing to a Western stabilization program in the spring of 1963, he withheld his full backing. And before the program's initial regulations had been given sufficient time to work, his disinterest grew. It turned to open disenchantment when the PKI mounted a fierce attack on the regulations.

In contrast to his disinterest in economics, Sukarno must have been positively attracted by the opportunity he faced in the foreign policy sphere. With West Irian and domestic rebellions settled, Indonesia was able to pursue the daring course in international affairs dictated by the President's anti-imperialism. Not only was she relatively free of domestic inhibitions, but she now possessed a military establishment that commanded the respect of her smaller neighbors, including Australia. Moreover, the gradual fragmentation of the cold war blocs had begun to usher in a phase of realignment in international politics that at once made non-alignment irrelevant and offered opportunity to a country aspiring to the status of a world power. Such was the chance that Sukarno saw both in opposing Malaysia and in defying the International Olympic Committee by organizing the Games of the New Emerging Forces.

Dispute Over Malaysia

The origins of Indonesia's confrontation with the Federation of Malaysia remain uncertain.⁽³⁷⁾ What is definite is that

(36) The case for the summer of 1962 as a turning point in Indonesian domestic politics, as well as in foreign affairs, has been made in Feith, "President Sukarno, the Army, and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape."

(37) The Malaysian dispute has been the subject of increasing scrutiny from all sides. For three of the more recent attempts by Western scholars, see Hindley, Donald, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives", Asian Survey, Vol. 4, June 1964, pp. 904-913; Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia"; and Curtis, Robert, "Malaysia and Indonesia", New Left Review, No. 28, November-December 1964. For the views of the Indonesian and Malaysian

Indonesia's strident propaganda against the formation of Malaysia arose only after the Brunei revolt of December 8, 1962. Although Djakarta did extend some covert aid to the rebels prior to the revolt, it is conceded even by the Malaysians that Indonesia did not instigate the rebellion.⁽³⁸⁾ Indonesia did, however, use the fact of the revolt as the basis for the charge that the planned federation did not command popular support in Brunei or in the British Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak. Moreover, she extended prompt moral, political, and eventually military support to rebel leader A. M. Azahari's self-proclaimed state of Kalimantan Utara which sought to embrace Brunei and the two British Borneo territories as well.

During the spring of 1963, simultaneous with the intensification of Indonesia's multifaceted effort to frustrate the formation of Malaysia, negotiations began among Malayan, Indonesian, and Philippine diplomats in Manila to seek a formula under which Indonesia and the Philippines could accept Malaysia. (The Philippines at this time echoed some of Indonesia's objections to the planned federation as part of her effort to win attention to her claim to much of Sabah.) Subministerial talks in April cleared the way for the surprisingly amicable meeting between Sukarno and the Tunku in Tokyo on June 1. There quickly followed a foreign ministers' gathering that set the stage for the climatic summer meeting of Sukarno, the Tunku, and Macapagal in Manila from July 31 through August 5.

The Manila Conference produced the long-sought formula under which Indonesia and the Philippines could accept the formation of Malaysia without losing face. The two powers asserted that they would welcome Malaysia if "the support of the people of the Borneo territories" is verified by an "independent and impartial authority", the U.N. Secretary-General or his representative. Consistent with this general commitment, the three governments requested that U Thant appoint working teams to carry out such an ascertainment.

governments, there are a number of official publications. Among others, see Government of the Republic of Indonesia, Why Indonesia Opposes British-Made 'Malaysia' (Djakarta: September 1964) and Federation of Malaysia, Malaya Indonesian Relations (Kuala Lumpur: 1963). Also see Department of Information, Government of Malaysia, Malaysia in Afro-Asia (November 1964). Much of the discussion that follows is, however, based on the author's conversations with diplomats in Djakarta during 1964-1965 and in Kuala Lumpur during a brief visit in June 1965.

(38) See Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia." But Kahin and others make the further point that the revolt derived from internal political discontent. The Malaysian case for pre-Brunei Indonesian planning to subvert Malaysia is set forth in Government of the Federation of Malaysia, Indonesian Intentions Toward Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: April 1964).

In addition to this accord on Malaysia, the three nations agreed to give concrete form to President Macapagal's proposal for a Maphilindo, a loose organization of the three Malay nations. At the time Maphilindo seemed a happy compromise of Western and Indonesian concepts of Southeast Asian security.(39) On one hand, Sukarno won recognition from the Tunku and Macapagal that their Western bases were "temporary in nature" and that regional security rested primarily with the governments and the peoples of the countries directly concerned. On the other hand, the Tunku, Macapagal, and many Americans felt that Maphilindo's chief security responsibility was to frustrate Chinese expansionism.

Finally, and perhaps most important, Sukarno's acceptance of the Manila Agreements seemed to indicate his preference for a peaceful extension of his influence in Southeast Asia within a Maphilindo framework rather than an aggressive pursuit of influence by means of confrontation. This preference would in turn favor the conditions necessary for the success of the American-sponsored economic stabilization program.

Despite these hopeful possibilities for channeling Indonesia's virulent nationalism into more temperate pursuits, the British viewed the Manila Agreements with both scepticism and irritation.(40) They rather felt that both the Malaysians and the Americans had been taken in by Indonesian charm and craft. Moreover, as the sovereign power in Sabah and Sarawak, they resented the Tunku's effort to conciliate Sukarno by agreeing to a U.N. opinion survey in their territories -- especially since this implied that the survey and legislative elections held under their supervision had been biased. Accordingly, it is not surprising that arguments occurred between the British and the Americans about a conciliatory approach towards Sukarno during the implementation of the accord on the U.N. opinion survey. Forcefully represented in the person of the Colonial Secretary, Duncan Sandys, British policy insisted on fulfilling no more than the letter of the Manila Agreements. And because of this London has provided at least some ground for Indonesian charges that British provocations prevented the proper carrying out of the

(39) For a discussion of a prevalent trend in official Indonesian thinking in 1963-1964 on the possibility of Maphilindo's serving as a compromise of Western and Indonesian security interests, see Bey, Arifin, "A Second Look at Southeast Asia" (Speech to American Men's Association in Djakarta, August 25, 1964). Also see Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia."

(40) For a summary of Anglo-American differences over the Malaysian dispute during the period up to early 1964, see Leifer, Michael, "Anglo-American Differences over Malaysia", The World Today, Vol. 20, April 1964, pp. 156-167.

accords.(41)

Whatever the reasons, the Indonesians in the end refused to accept U Thant's finding that Malaysia did command popular support in the two Borneo territories. The ensuing bitterness engendered between Djakarta on one hand and Kuala Lumpur and London on the other found its most dramatic expression in the burning of the British embassy and British homes in Djakarta. There followed Sukarno's decision to break economic relations with the now formed Federation of Malaysia. This extreme step wrecked the last hopes for the American economic stabilization program. Washington announced that it would abandon its effort to organize a European aid consortium to back the stabilization plan. Still exhibiting restraint, America did not, however, follow British wishes that she terminate her aid program in Indonesia.

Behind this evidence of restraint in Washington was the continuing hope that it could retain sufficient leverage on Sukarno to coax him back to the conference table.(42) As in the period immediately following the Manila summit, the United States again sought to play a role reminiscent of her stance in the later stages of the West Irian problem. Encouraged by the Indonesians to play this quasi-mediator part, the United States actively backed Thai and Philippine mediation attempts,

(41) The most serious of the alleged British provocations concerns the announcement by the Malayan government on August 29 that Malaysia would be formed on September 16 irrespective of the findings of the U.N. survey mission. Although British and Malaysian diplomats are sometimes willing to concede that this pre-announcement was a tactical error, they stress the compelling legal and domestic political considerations that influenced the Malayan cabinet to decide to make such an announcement. Moreover, a special Malayan mission went to Djakarta before making it public to explain the reasons to Foreign Minister Subandrio. Malaysians claim that Subandrio voiced no objections during his meeting with the mission. Finally, Sukarno's opponents stress that whatever the impact of this and other British provocations it was not decisive in motivating Indonesia to reject the U.N. findings. In fact, they argue, the opposition to Malaysia in military terms was continuing throughout the period of negotiations. For an example of this latter view, presented by an informed Australian journalist, see Grant, Bruce, Indonesia (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1964), pp. 141-145.

(42) This interpretation of America's role is based on comments made to the author by both American and other Western diplomats in Djakarta during 1964 and in Kuala Lumpur during a brief visit in June 1965.

and in January 1964 sent Robert Kennedy to confer with all the interested parties. Eventually, despite persistent British-Malaysian distrust of Sukarno, ministerial talks took place in February and again in March in Bangkok. Although these only served to confirm the Tunku's suspicions of Indonesian aims and tactics, he finally compromised his insistent demand that Indonesian guerrillas completely withdraw from Malaysian territory prior to the opening of negotiations.

The Tunku's concession on this critical point prepared the way for the meeting between the three Maphilindo leaders in Tokyo on June 21. Only President Macapagal's personal intervention salvaged an agreement in principle to refer the dispute to a four-nation Afro-Asian commission. President Sukarno appeared to go a step further than the Tunku by pledging also to accept the findings of the still unselected commission. The Tunku, on the other hand, agreed in principle to the commission proposal with the condition that all hostilities against Malaysia stop forthwith.(43)

During the 12 months following the abortive Tokyo summit, the most significant development in the dispute was Indonesia's decision in mid-August 1964 to extend her guerrilla attacks from the Borneo territories to the Malayan peninsula. This decision altered both the military and political terms of the dispute.

Militarily this Indonesian action generated a further buildup of British military, naval, and air forces in the defense of Malaysia. The perceptible escalation by both sides moreover, greatly increased the possibility of a British retaliatory attack on Indonesia. This risk persisted in spite of the fact that none of the Indonesian landings on the peninsula succeeded. In addition to the increased British commitment to Malaysia's defense, Australia sent her first combat troops to Borneo. Meanwhile, Australia and other Commonwealth countries -- including India -- stiffened their support for Kuala Lumpur in political and sometimes financial terms. Most notable of all was the impact on the position of the long neutral United States. Even before the first Indonesian landings on the Malayan peninsula President Johnson had welcomed the Tunku to Washington and promised to sell him some military equipment.

(43) The Indonesian government has laid great stress on Sukarno's willingness to commit himself to accepting the findings of such a commission. Privately some Foreign Office officials have suggested Sukarno acted in this regard over the objections of his advisers. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that with even one supporter on the four-nation commission Indonesia would still be able to block any unanimous recommendations inimical to her.

After the landing attempts this formal promise rested on a much firmer sympathy for Malaysia than at the time when it was first made.(44)

Indonesia sought to offset these shifts in the military balance by seeking additional military aid from the Soviet Union. While new promises were extracted from Moscow, delivery was slow apparently in large part because of disenchantment with a nation which had badly defaulted in paying off its existing debts to the U.S.S.R. in both a financial and political sense. Although the Chinese were presumably anxious to exploit this rift between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, the Chinese apparently could not supply the kinds of arms the Indonesians required. More importantly, the army was most reluctant to make any direct military arrangements with the Chinese that would involve their sending any advisers to Indonesia.(45)

Perhaps of even greater import than the military escalation of the conflict were the repercussions in the international arena. The mere fact of Indonesia's extending her armed subversion to the territory of Malaya proper hurt her cause, for even Djakarta formerly recognized Malaya as a sovereign state without ever suggesting that her government was deserving of subversion by an outside power. In short, the logic of Indonesia's case against the inclusion of the Borneo territories in the Federation of Malaysia could not be convincingly stretched to justify attacks on Malaya proper.

For a number of nations, the still more damning aspect of Indonesia's landings in Malaya was the stand she took before the U.N. Security Council in September 1964.(46) There she

(44) The evolution of American policy since the Tokyo summit was also greatly influenced by the strong anti-American character of President Sukarno's Independence Day speech of August 17, 1964. For a perceptive analysis of Washington's view of Indonesia in the late summer and fall of 1964, see the articles by Bruce Grant reporting from Washington in The Statesman of New Delhi as well as in other newspapers. In particular, see "Indonesian Challenge to U.S. Presence in S.E. Asia", The Statesman, October 19, 1964.

(45) For reference to the anti-Chinese attitude of the Indonesian army leadership, see Feith, "Indonesia", p. 267.

(46) The author concedes that his view of Afro-Asian reaction to the Security Council debate is based primarily on the comments of diplomats and newspapers from nations which Indonesia would have regarded as unrepresentative of Afro-Asian feeling. Also see Department of Foreign Affairs,

boldly dismissed prevailing standards of international law as irrelevant to a situation which Indonesia had chosen to define as a conflict between the "new emerging forces" and the "old established forces." The fact that the Security Council's two African members -- the Ivory Coast and Morocco -- voted against Indonesia is some index of the cool reception that the Indonesian justification received in the moderate and non-aligned Afro-Asian world -- especially in the smaller nations who faced the prospect of encroachment by larger neighbors. Equally telling was the attitude of Indonesia's recent friend in the Malaysia dispute -- the Philippines. As President Macapagal's subsequent statements indicated, he cooled considerably in his regard for Indonesia's policies.(47) Indeed, he manifested some suspicion of her intentions toward his own country. By itself, of course, no single episode in a dispute as relatively minor as the Malaysia question can have much impact on a broad range of countries. But the peninsula landings initiated a perceptible feeling of distrust of Indonesian aims and methods in the minds of a number of nations which had previously held either no attitude on the dispute or an attitude of passive acceptance of Indonesia's charges of British neo-colonialism in Malaysia. The much more dramatic decision in Djakarta to quit the United Nations in early January 1965 reinforced the direction of this new current of Afro-Asian distrust and disapproval of Indonesia's confrontation foreign policy.(48)

The growing alienation of Indonesia from moderate and non-aligned nations in the Afro-Asian world accelerated the develop-

Djakarta, 1964, "The 'Malaysia' Issue Before the United Nations Security Council" for the speeches of the Indonesian spokesman.

- (47) The author is indebted to Philippine diplomats for corroboration of the reported shift in President Macapagal's views. See reports of Macapagal's stance in the United States in The New York Times, October 9, 1964. Among other things Macapagal publicly stated that no new negotiations were possible on the Malaysia question before Indonesia met "the minimum condition that the Indonesians who landed on the Malaya mainland are withdrawn." Citation is from a mimeographed copy of Macapagal's October 7 speech in Washington.
- (48) Djakarta's own press is the best proof of the unfavorable reaction from virtually all nations except China, North Vietnam, and North Korea. Non-government papers in several countries, such as the communist Ludu of Burma, also backed Indonesia. Throughout the first week of January the government press in Djakarta published reports of the unfavorable response -- apparently partly in an effort to dramatize the boldness of President Sukarno in defying world opinion.

ment of her intimate collaboration with Communist China.(49) Although still dependent on the Soviets for much of his modern military hardware and spare parts for existing equipment, Sukarno had always been attracted by the militancy, organization, and economic progress of the Chinese. This attraction was heightened in a situation where he found himself nearly alone in advocating a revolutionary line both domestically and internationally. Moreover, for the moment at least, Chinese ideological compatibility was not offset by any major conflict of political interests in what each country saw for the time being as its respective sphere of influence in Asia. The remarkable congruence of Chinese and Indonesian interests during the early months of 1965 found concrete expression in Subandrio's January mission to Peking. A week of formal talks produced 50 million dollars in Chinese credits, a bitter joint denunciation of America as the chief imperialist enemy, and strong hints of a Sino-Indonesian campaign to establish a rival organization to the United Nations.(50)

Indonesia's military escalation with its attendant international impact on her foreign relations in turn influenced the domestic political balance within the country.(51) On one hand, the position of the PKI was greatly enhanced as the President came more and more to echo its slogans and policies. But this visible leftward trend toward China abroad and toward the PKI at home stimulated the non-communist forces in Indonesia to reassess their stake in the "crush Malaysia" campaign. Cognizant of how the PKI had used the West Irian issue to further its political position, the military leaders sought means to prevent the Malaysia issue from functioning too much to the PKI advantage. Reportedly such considerations led the army to back the President's own apparent inclination to seek a negotiated settlement of the dispute in early March and perhaps again in early May.(52) The fact that Sukarno finally refused

(49) See earlier portions of this essay for comment on the Djakarta-Peking relationship. Also see Mazingo, op. cit., pp. 53-84, for the period covered here.

(50) Mazingo reports that the 50 million dollar credit was extended during the November 1964 visit to Djakarta of Chen Yi. See ibid., pp. 69-72.

(51) This paragraph must be regarded as even more tentative and speculative than previous portions of the essay because it is based on the author's distillation of various rumors in Djakarta in the spring of 1965.

(52) Several Western sources felt that a genuine initiative had come from the President in late February. At least one version pictured Foreign Minister Subandrio as having scuttled this initiative by sowing discord and confusion

to enter into negotiations on both these occasions was widely interpreted as evidence of the new weight given to PKI and Chinese attitudes in his calculations. But as argued at the outset, it is always risky to say that Sukarno has become anyone's captive. Although his policies may have been parallel to the Chinese and PKI lines at this juncture in history, it is well to remember that the roots of Sukarno's policy are much vaguer, much more romantic, and, above all, much more nationalistic than the scholastic teachings of Marxism-Leninism.

Rejection of Non-Alignment and Consolidation of the New Emerging Forces

In the wake of the West Irian victory in August 1962, Sukarno found himself almost immediately engaged in an episode that would eventually emerge as Indonesia's first success in giving concrete, political form to the evolving concept of the new emerging forces. The "Sondhi Affair", as the episode is now remembered, arose out of Indonesia's refusal to issue invitations to Taiwan and Israel to participate in the 4th Asian Games staged in Djakarta's new sports arena in late August 1962. Reflecting the growing divergence in Indonesian and Indian attitudes and policies, the incident is more significant for its triggering Sukarno's impulsive decision to organize a rival sports festival -- the Games of the New Emerging Forces, or Ganefo. This decision, first announced in the fall of 1962, took firm shape in February 1963 when the International Olympic Committee voted to suspend Indonesia because of her discriminatory treatment of Israel and Taiwan.

Issuing a formal call for a conference in Djakarta to organize GANEFO I, Indonesia again experienced the lukewarm response from Asian-African countries that she had met before in her efforts to launch a second AA Conference.⁽⁵³⁾ As two

among the various potential mediators. It should be noted, however, that Subandrio was a popular scapegoat among Westerners in Djakarta and pro-Western Indonesians. Speculation about talks revived in early May after a Tunku invitation to Sukarno. The prevalent notion at that time was that Indonesia was in such clear danger of defeat on the Malaysia question at the projected second AA Conference in June that she would have to make at least a temporary settlement in order to avoid acute embarrassment at the Conference. That this particular line of reasoning was injected into the rumor mill by the Malaysian side is not to be ruled out.

- (53) One device that assisted in enrolling participants was the fact that the Indonesian government paid the travel expenses of the foreign participants. For this and several other aspects of the April Preparatory Conference for Ganefo, see

years earlier, only the Chinese gave vigorous diplomatic and rumored material support for Sukarno's initiative. Accordingly, the list of sponsors who appeared at the April organizational meeting provides a partial index of the character and limits of Asian-African political backing for Sukarno's increasingly militant confrontation with the old established forces. Apart from the predictable support from the Chinese and North Vietnamese, the only Asian sponsors were Pakistan and Cambodia. From Africa came the wealthier and more active of the Casablanca group -- Guinea and Mali; from the Middle East, the influential and ambitious United Arab Republic together with Iraq. Inevitably the Soviets also joined the venture in an obvious effort to retain Sukarno's affections and prevent China's manipulation of Ganefo for her own ends.

It is a credit to Indonesia's diplomatic skill that she could use this initial nucleus of support to rally over 50 delegations to the November games. To be sure, the majority of the participants protected their stake in the 1964 Olympics by sending non-official or secondary teams. Nevertheless, Indonesia succeeded in staging a gigantic sports festival that impressed Indonesians and foreigners alike. Moreover, she used the occasion of the games to sustain the presidential political challenge to the International Olympic Committee. At Indonesia's behest, the original sponsors together with 26 other countries agreed to establish a Ganefo Federation with the headquarters in Djakarta. The Federation in turn agreed to hold GANEFO II in Cairo in 1967. The concept of the new emerging forces had at last become a concrete political reality.⁽⁵⁴⁾

Although preoccupied with Malaysia and Ganefo through most of 1963, Sukarno also persisted in his drive for a second AA Conference. Responding to the counter-initiative for a Non-Bloc Conference taken in October by the moderates -- India, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia -- Indonesia joined with China and Pakistan in an intensive diplomatic campaign to win precedence for the AA Conference.⁽⁵⁵⁾ While failing to

Department of Information, Djakarta, "Documents on the Preparatory Conference for Ganefo held in Djakarta 27-29 April 1963." For an acute analysis of some of the major ways in which Ganefo served Indonesian foreign and domestic purposes, see Pauker, Ewa T. "GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta", Asian Survey, Vol. 5, April 1965, pp. 171-185.

(54) For details of the Ganefo Congress and the Ganefo Federation see the special section from the government news agency bulletin Antara entitled "Berita Ganefo" which was published throughout the month of November 1963.

(55) Pakistan's Foreign Minister Bhutto gave his strong backing to a second AA Conference on November 24. See Antara, November 25, 1963. The first major Indonesian statements

disrupt the plans for the Non-Bloc Conference which was set for October 1964 in Cairo, the three militants did succeed in launching their own project. A ministerial-level meeting held in Djakarta in April 1964 agreed to convene the long-deferred second AA Conference the following spring in Africa.(56)

At the October Non-Bloc Conference Sukarno's address entitled "The Era of Confrontation" (57) was aimed at the younger African nations and the liberation movements who still felt the urgency of destroying the colonial dragon.(58) To the distress of the conference's sponsors Sukarno appears to have had some impact on at least six or seven of them. But the sponsors had even greater cause for irritation with him.(59) Moving beyond the position he staked out three years earlier at Belgrade, Sukarno ridiculed the idea that non-alignment still had a role to play in a world now marked by the fragmentation of the earlier cold war blocs. As if to underscore his point about the abatement of cold war tensions, he omitted all reference to disarmament and nuclear testing. Rather he focused on imperialism as the threat to peace. "World peace today," Sukarno argued, "is a problem of how to achieve security for the developing nations during this period of transition to a new order in the world." Trampling on another idea cherished by the moderates, he justified his unstable economy by insisting that the self-reliance induced through waging a vast combat against nekolim was more than worth the economic cost. Such was the priority on achieving self-reliance, or character-building, that all assistance from abroad was suspect. Here was the reasoning behind his now frequent cry of "go to hell with your aid" -- directed first at the United States and then at the U.N. agencies.

Apart from staking out a radical position publicly at odds with that of the rival power group members, Sukarno charged

appear in ibid., December 18, 1963, by Foreign Minister Subandrio and PNI Chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo.

- (56) For the single fullest treatment of the preparatory conference, see Weinstein, Franklin B., "The Second Asian-African Conference: Preliminary Bouts", Asian Survey, Vol. 5, July 1965, pp. 359-373.
- (57) See Department of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, 1964, "The Era of Confrontation."
- (58) Indonesia's interest in Africa is reflected in her expansion of her diplomatic relations with countries south of the Sahara during 1964. See review article on this development in The Indonesian Herald, December 30-31, 1964.
- (59) See report of Hedrick Smith from Cairo in The New York Times, October 7, 1964.

them with indifference to the anti-nekolim struggle in Africa. In characterizing Yugoslavia, India, and even the United Arab Republic as "arrivee" -- i.e., lacking in revolutionary vigor -- Sukarno made plain his willingness to stand alone with a radical minority in Afro-Asian politics. It is this uncompromising determination to sacrifice the applause of the majority for the cause of building a militant nucleus of supporters that he exhibited in walking out of the Tokyo Olympics and then the United Nations.

A like determination seemed to guide Sukarno in the weeks of hectic diplomatic maneuver that preceded the projected second AA Conference (scheduled for Algiers in June 1965). While Indonesia's numerous diplomatic emissaries to Afro-Asian capitals may have been more conciliatory in tone, Sukarno publicly displayed contempt for those nations which declined to endorse his confrontation policy.⁽⁶⁰⁾ More particularly, he repeatedly committed himself -- seemingly irrevocably -- to his prime demand, namely that the "neo-colonialist project Malaysia" be denied admission to the conference.

Given Sukarno's rather isolated position in Afro-Asian circles in the spring of 1965, such a posture seemed to entail a number of grave risks for his policy.⁽⁶¹⁾ The most immediate and serious one was that Sukarno would further isolate himself at the very time he still needed broad Afro-Asian support -- or at least broader than he currently enjoyed. On the question of Malaysia's admission to the conference he seemed in a very weak position. Thanks to India's active backing and her own improved

(60) Sukarno's personally-organized celebration in Djakarta in April of the tenth anniversary of the first Afro-Asian conference illustrated his apparent disregard for the feelings of the conservative and moderate nations in the Afro-Asian world. Several delegations were irritated by his permitting the North Vietnamese to propagandize their cause at an occasion that Sukarno had promised would be ceremonial. Moreover, there were a number of smaller affronts to various delegations. The most outraged person of all was the Thai Foreign Minister who left the celebration and returned home in protest. See the Bangkok World, April 20-22, 1965, for the Thai view.

(61) The following discussion of Indonesia and the aborted second Afro-Asia conference of last June is based on interviews the author had with diplomats in Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, New Delhi, and Cairo during June and July, 1965. The Indian press is particularly useful in dealing with the period because of its inclusion of a greater range of analytical reports than the press of either Indonesia or the United Arab Republic.

diplomacy, Malaysia had won at least passive support for her admission from over a majority of Afro-Asian nations. As for the prospects of winning conference endorsement for his confrontation policy and slogans, Sukarno again stood in a minority position -- though less so than on the Malaysia issue. But his uncompromising attitude threatened to further weaken his position because it ran counter to the dominant sentiment of the participants. Most prominently advocated by the influential Egyptians and the prospective hosts, the Algerians, this was a deep desire to preserve at least the appearance of Afro-Asian solidarity. This meant that showdowns on controversial issues must be avoided at all costs. The alternative was to risk an irreparable schism in the Afro-Asian world that could only serve to weaken and embarrass it in the eyes of other nations. Equally serious for many of the smaller nations heavily dependent on one or more of the great powers was the prospect of being forced to take sides on issues vital to the interests of their benefactors. By defying this dominant sentiment Sukarno also endangered the most personal of his projects -- the Conference of the New Emerging Forces (Conefo) -- for which he hoped to win broad backing.⁽⁶²⁾

Without knowing the inner history of Indonesia's private lobbying in the capitals of two continents, no sure interpretation can be given for Sukarno's reasons for virtually ignoring the need for a more conciliatory approach to Afro-Asian moderates. Apart from the President's typical enchantment with bold means to advance radical goals, the equally familiar presence of shrewdness in Indonesian policy must not be ignored. In some ways the Indonesian strategy was tailored to Djakarta's rather desperate minority position. On the Malaysian issue, for example, Indonesian diplomats would concede that Malaysia might indeed have a virtual majority behind her, but would then stress that the issue was likely to be settled by a committee set up by the conference of foreign ministers that would precede the full summit conference. In short, Indonesian tactics focused on the individual nations and the procedural devices that would ultimately decide Malaysia's fate. Moreover, the Indonesians -- and the Chinese -- seemed to calculate that a vociferous, uncompromising minority could prevail by intimidating the largely passive majority. Some would desert the conference altogether in protest -- but by so doing reduce the weight of their views in conference discussions. Others would,

(62) The importance of Conefo to Sukarno apparently did inhibit his strategy for the second AA Conference in at least one major respect. It seemed to have been one of the key factors -- together with his desire for more arms and debt forgiveness -- that led Indonesia not to openly oppose Russian participation at the proposed Algiers conference. This meant that the Sino-Indonesian working alliance was not complete.

indeed, resist, but a few could be expected to appease the determined minority in the interests of conference harmony.

Whatever the true proportions of these various elements in the Indonesian strategy, it was never tested. The Boumedienne coup intervened. It provided the moderates and the indifferent a convenient pretext for postponing the conference. In the wake of this sudden turn of events, Sukarno moved quickly to exploit the interval before November, the new date for the conference. At his initiative a "Little Summit" meeting was convened in Cairo at the end of June among the leaders of China, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic. While the first three nations failed in their obvious bid to win Nasser's support on critical issues, such as Vietnam, Soviet and Malaysian participation, and Kashmir, they did seize the initiative in the new round of maneuvers in anticipation of the fall meeting.

Meanwhile, the Djakarta Chinese engineers worked feverishly to construct the gigantic conference hall intended for Sukarno's Conference of the New Emerging Forces. Planned for August 1966 Conefo was to have marked the fulfillment of Sukarno's confrontation foreign policy. His concept of the new emerging forces would have at last found concrete political expression in a formal grouping of the world's truly anti-imperialist nations and elements that was clearly intended to rival the United Nations. Such was the unreduced scale of Sukarno's ambitions for Sukarno and Indonesia in the summer of 1965.

Evaluation

Manner of Execution

In weighing the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy under Guided Democracy even her critics acknowledge the skill with which she has carried it out. Bold, cunning, and unpredictable, this conduct tends to keep her opponents off balance. Best illustrated by the methods employed to recover West Irian, Indonesia's executive astuteness commanded considerable respect from diplomats.

The manner in which Indonesian policy was executed brings several adjectives to mind -- bold is perhaps the foremost of these, for it is this characteristic which justifies the description of "brinkmanship." To the bafflement of friends and adversaries Sukarno repeatedly took actions that have seemed to defy rational calculation of Indonesia's own self-interest. There seemed an incredible willingness to risk diplomatic embarrassment, as in the decision to leave the United Nations; economic dislocation, as in the abrupt decision to sever trade relations with Singapore; military disaster, as in the sending

of new infiltrators into the Malayan peninsula after clear warning of British readiness to administer a bloody reprisal. Why? Even those who supported the President's crusade of the new emerging forces often asked the same question.

Primary in the complex of factors behind this "brinkmanship" was the emotional nationalism that was at the forefront of the President's motivations. The ideological-psychological compulsions that led him to opt for confrontation over economic development also inevitably dictated a boldness in execution consistent with the spirit of his goals. Revolutionary goals demanded revolutionary implementation -- at least in the President's eyes, not to mention the PKI and frequently the army. This approach is well illustrated by Sukarno's conscious effort to abandon "conventional" diplomacy for a revolutionary diplomacy. Not only did all Indonesian Foreign Ministry officials receive regular indoctrination in the President's credos, but they underwent annual military training for six weeks.

Reinforcing this revolutionary approach was a paradoxical self-confidence -- paradoxical because it was found in a President and a political elite still afflicted by inferiority feelings. This confidence manifested itself as an unquestioning faith in Indonesia's ability to triumph over the most impossible odds. Encouraged by the success of the current revolutionary generation in defeating the Dutch, this confidence also found reinforcement in the President's ideological beliefs. There was the notion that self-reliant nations can only arise out of "struggle" over adversity. In addition, there was the Marxist conviction about the inevitability of history blessing the new emerging forces with victory over the imperialists and colonialists. Particularly this latter belief appeared to have won wide acceptance in the political public. As such it provided not only a fertile ground for the regime's justifications of its bold demarches, but an important sustainer of the regime's own faith in history's favor.

Such is a partial indication of the deep-seated character of Indonesia's bold manner in advancing her confrontation policy. By itself this boldness presented a challenge to the most perceptive of diplomatic opponents. But to complicate matters Indonesia's conduct of policy exhibited an almost contradictory quality concurrently with its boldness. This was a cunning, a deftness in maneuver, that won grudging respect from Indonesia's enemies as well as her friends. This respect derived from admiration for Sukarno's masterful handling of the West Irian campaign, the success in organizing Ganefo, and Subandrio's finesse in handling conference politics. Another element in this reputation for cunning -- found chiefly among Western diplomats -- was a dislike for Indonesia's goals that spilled over into a distrust for her methods. In any case, the reputation for cunning reached the point where diplomats were never sure that Djakarta's boldness was as irrational as it first appeared.

An excellent example in this regard is the reaction of several diplomats to Indonesia's sudden decision to quit the United Nations. Initial expression of shock at "Sukarno's insane impulsiveness" soon gave way to a contrary set of assumptions about the roots of his decision. The suspicion arose that the decision must have been planned; that the Chinese Foreign Minister must have been consulted; and that it must be connected with Indonesian plans to invade Malaysia. In short, there was a retreat from a "madness" interpretation to a "method" interpretation.

The prominence of both boldness and cunning in Indonesia's policy in part explained the unpredictability in it. But other factors also contributed to unpredictability. One of these was the distortion of information that one can hypothesize must have occurred in the authoritarian Guided Democracy as data was filtered from below to the top. There was the ever present possibility that even the most trusted subordinate would lack the courage to tell the President the truth -- even when that "truth" was taken for granted by the other actors in a particular diplomatic episode. But there can be no hard evidence to demonstrate this point. Likewise evidence is impressionistic and circumstantial for another frequently mentioned factor. This is the sensitivity of a young nation compounded by the personal vanity of its supreme leader. There are many stories of how Sukarno took offense at the insults and pressures from abroad. With a leader prone to outbursts, no observer could safely forecast the limits of Sukarno's moves, although a person might be able to anticipate their general direction. Moreover, in dealing with such a sensitive, volatile leader, no adversary can safely assume that conventional levers of economic and political or military pressure will produce their intended effect. Indeed, the very reverse is possible -- but not always. And herein lay the fundamental ingredient of unpredictability in Indonesia's policy moves.

"National Interest" and Foreign Policy

A proper evaluation of Indonesian foreign policy under Guided Democracy must consider more than the manner in which it was conducted. Ultimately, Djakarta's confrontation policy like any other one must be judged in terms of its effectiveness in advancing the "national interest." The absence of an objective definition for this ultimate criterion inevitably complicates the evaluator's task, but it should not bar him from attempting an appraisal provided he specifies the particular meaning he gives the beguiling term "national interest."

The Internal Impact

For most Western observers and probably a majority of Afro-Asian observers, the most critical index for measuring the

"national interest" of a developing nation after several years of independence is that of economic progress. On this index, as noted at the outset, Sukarno himself would admit his low rating. He would debate with his critics only about the degree of his failure in the economic field. Moreover, despite official propaganda to the contrary, Sukarno has as much as conceded that the economic failures of his government were the necessary concomitants of his confrontation foreign policy. The self-reliance theory of economic development which he set forth at the Cairo Conference became the guideline for Indonesia's new economic policy, and the deliberate invitation of economic hardship became a plank in the government program. No better example could be cited for the frank subordination of economic welfare to political and ideological priorities.

It is precisely because of the frank character of Sukarno's priorities that it is both relevant and just to judge the internal impact of his foreign policy from a political and psychological standpoint as well as the more conventional economic one. Here the critical index is whether Sukarno's prosecution of an anti-nekolim crusade generated the political unity and the self-confidence that he claimed. Denied the statistical measures available in the economic sphere, there is no alternative to the use of the impressions registered by participants in and observers of Indonesian society. Generally, even Sukarno's opponents will credit him with building in Indonesia, at least for a while, the national feeling that is prerequisite to building a consensus in a transitional society. More directly bearing on political unity is Sukarno's widely recognized accomplishment in balancing and harnessing for a period of time Indonesia's antagonistic ideological, socio-religious, ethnic, and regional groupings. However, it is more difficult to estimate how much of this accomplishment has been due to his foreign policy as distinguished from his domestic political maneuverings. Still more basic in this regard is the question of how lasting was the feeling and substance of unity that Sukarno created. There is no indication that his nasakom formula for political integration took root in the attitudes of major political parties. Indeed, it is just for this reason that some came to view Sukarno's achievement as merely a holding operation. Even his supporters confessed apprehension about a post-Sukarno period when Indonesia would have the legacy of only the President's vague formulas, not the magic of his personality.

Related to the question of Sukarno's ability to develop political unity is the question of his success in building what he called "national character." Again only an impressionistic basis for evaluation is available. It is plain to even the foreign observer that Indonesians of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary generations are much more confident than their elders in dealing with foreigners. Surely Sukarno's self-conscious policy of making Indonesia a leader in foreign affairs -- whatever its impact abroad -- has given the politically aware

Indonesian a greater sense of his nation's importance and, indeed, of his own importance. Moreover, the creation by Sukarno of various symbols of national prestige -- regardless of their cost -- flatters the ego of a people long taught that the construction of great monuments and the hosting of international conferences were outside the competence of "natives."

One can argue then that Sukarno's foreign policy has contributed to the feeling of national unity and self-confidence in Indonesia. But, as noted above, it remains unclear in the long run how deep, how extensive, and how lasting these feelings are. And, more fundamentally, one must ask whether Sukarno's priorities are themselves consistent with "national interest." Even if he built unity and confidence, was it worth the stagnation and -- at times -- suffering endured by his people in the economic sphere?

The Impact Abroad

The mixed and tentative appraisal given of the impact of Sukarno's foreign policy internally is paralleled by a similar appraisal of its impact externally. Sukarno's repeated stress on the priority of the "security of the developing countries" -- of the necessity of complete political and economic independence as the prior condition for genuine economic development -- compels the commentator to ask whether Indonesia became more secure from foreign intervention between 1960 and 1965.

Certainly Sukarno's foreign policy must be rated well in one aspect of national security. His policy during the West Irian campaign and subsequent to it resulted in the rise of a nearly modern military establishment. It easily dwarfed the forces of Indonesia's Maphilindo neighbors, and constituted a potential challenge to Australia which is not able to match Indonesia's army of 400,000. It must be quickly added, however, that Djakarta's economic and administrative weakness combined with its dependence on external sources for spare parts and new equipment seriously limit the potential of its newly-acquired military might.

More relevant to an estimate of Indonesia's current security from foreign intervention is the question of the effectiveness of her "crush Malaysia" campaign, for this action must be viewed in part as the first concerted employment of her new military potential to expand her political influence regionally. Inspired by the masterful use of military, political, and diplomatic pressures to wrest West Irian from the Dutch, the "crush Malaysia" campaign proved largely unsuccessful. Although Malaysia's supporters admit that the new federation would have been better off without Indonesia's confrontation, they see both her military incursions and her political subversion as "a flop." Moreover, from the standpoint of Indonesia's

security, it can be argued that her Malaysia campaign actually boomeranged. As already pointed out, her aggressive behavior elicited a more than countervailing military response from the very Western powers that she sought to drive out of Southeast Asia. At the same time Indonesia sowed enough distrust in the minds of her once sympathetic Malayan and Philippine neighbors to make them much more receptive to the perpetuation of their Western military bases than they might otherwise have been. In short, the "crush Malaysia" campaign led to more "Western encirclement" rather than less.

Before one embraces this argument that Sukarno's confrontation with Malaysia boomeranged, some important qualifications must be entered in the ledger. If again the issue is seen from Sukarno's standpoint, it is noteworthy that his supporters would concede a number of the adverse effects of confrontation. They would, however, stress the transitory nature of both the new Western commitments to Malaysia's defense and the injured feelings of Indonesia's neighbors. The latter would pass with time and with the advent of more "progressive" governments in those nations. As for Western resolve, there were already signs of Britain's impatience with the financial burden of her defense commitment to Malaysia. In addition, the neo-isolationist sentiment emerging in both Britain and the United States would crystallize with the deepening disaster of American policy in Vietnam. In short, Indonesia would argue that the short-term pressures she placed upon the Western powers would reinforce what she saw as the basic trend in Asian international relations -- the eclipse of the influence of the West by the resurgence of Asian nations led by a militantly anti-imperialist vanguard centered in Djakarta and Peking.

Thus in rendering a final estimate the analyst again encounters Sukarno's undaunted faith in the historical inevitability of his new emerging forces prevailing. It is this faith that insulated him from despair over signs of deepening Western hostility and budding Afro-Asian distrust. In Sukarno's view such developments were necessary aspects of the struggle that would end in victory for the new emerging forces. Such was the engrained premise that colors his perception of the world and inspires a confrontation foreign policy. And in conclusion, the honest observer must recognize the compelling, if simple, logic of Sukarno's basic approach. Confronted with the reality of Western political and economic dominance in world affairs generally as well as in his own region, Sukarno saw no other way to achieve his personal-national aspiration for influence and respect than by relentlessly battling against the West.